In modern electoral culture, the phrase «a politician promises» has long been synonymous with populism and manipulation.
There is a persistent belief that campaign platforms are written solely to garner votes, only to be archived immediately after the election.
However, international political science meta-studies prove otherwise: in developed democracies, the implementation rate of campaign promises is surprisingly high, hovering between 50% and 85%.
A leader’s honesty in the 21st century is measured not by their moral qualities, but by their Pledge Fulfillment Index.
This indicator depends directly on a state’s institutional design—its electoral system, the type of government (single-party or coalition), and the stability of the bureaucratic apparatus.
While Western and Northern Europe demonstrate a predictable systemic clarity, the transition democracies of Eastern Europe, and Ukraine in particular, face tectonic force majeure factors. In these realities, classical laws of political science give way to crisis management and national survival, completely rewriting leaders’ original commitments to their citizens.
The British Steamroller and the German Tightrope: Why Honesty in the West Is Just a Matter of Parliamentary Math
An analysis of promise fulfillment by specific European leaders shows a direct dependence between the structure of power and a politician’s effectiveness.
Tony Blair and David Cameron (UK): Systemic Record Holders
The British Westminster system is ideal ground for fulfilling promises. According to comparative Pledge Fulfillment studies, the cabinets of Tony Blair and David Cameron implemented over 85% of their manifesto provisions. Armed with an absolute majority in the House of Commons, these prime ministers did not need to make concessions to the opposition, allowing their reform programs (from Scottish devolution under Blair to austerity under Cameron) to be introduced virtually unobstructed.
Angela Merkel (Germany): A Hostage to Coalitions
The former Chancellor of Germany demonstrated a moderate level of promise fulfillment (around 60–65%). In the conditions of a classical German coalition (the CDU/CSU block allied with the SPD), Angela Merkel was forced to sign a multi-page coalition agreement before forming each government. As a result, some CDU promises (e.g., regarding tax breaks for businesses) were regularly sacrificed to the social initiatives of their partners.
Giorgia Meloni (Italy): Ideological Compromise
In countries with high parliamentary fragmentation, such as Italy, politicians traditionally fulfill no more than 45–50% of their promises. Rising to power on a wave of fiery right-wing slogans, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni faced the need to balance within a coalition and align strict budget frameworks with the European Commission. This led to a softening of her original rhetoric and the abandonment of several radical economic promises.
Force Majeure Honesty: Why History Commutes Pre-War Promises in Ukraine, While Brussels Audits Aftermath
The Ukrainian political landscape is unique: here, the classical political science model of «promise equals law» clashes with oligarchic influences, an incomplete transition of power institutions, and, since 2022, the conditions of a total existential war.
According to data from the specialized Ukrainian analytical center «Slovo i Dilo», which tracks the promises of top politicians in real time, the electoral markers of Ukrainian presidents feature a highly specific dynamic.
Petro Poroshenko (2014–2019)
The fifth president of Ukraine built his campaign amid the onset of hybrid Russian aggression.
What was fulfilled: Strategic geopolitical promises—signing the EU Association Agreement, securing a visa-free regime, establishing an independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Tomos), and anchoring the NATO and EU course in the Constitution.
What failed: Emotional military and economic promises. The primary failure was the pledge to end the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) in «a matter of hours,» as well as unfulfilled obligations to radically lower utility tariffs and achieve swift de-oligarchization (including the case of selling his own Roshen business, which was transferred to a «blind trust» only toward the end of his term). By the end of his presidency, Poroshenko’s overall pledge fulfillment rate hovered around 45–48%.
The Illusion Audit: How 26 Peace-Time Pledges Transformed into Digitized Survival Stats
The sixth president of Ukraine came to power on a wave of unprecedented populism and a demand for elite renewal, subsequently securing the first parliamentary mono-majority in the country’s history.
Analysts at «Slovo i Dilo» have recorded an unprecedented body of data: over his entire political career, Volodymyr Zelensky has made 1,107 promises (including his campaign platform, ongoing statements, public tracks, and official wartime addresses).
The implementation dynamic of this entire array of obligations is as follows:
Fulfilled: 483 promises
Failed: 239 promises
In progress / Awaiting deadlines: 385 promises
If we strip away current statements and focus strictly on the official 2019 campaign document, the platform points are distributed across three electoral baskets:
Implementation Stats for V. Zelensky's Official Platform:
[████████████▍ ] Fulfilled — 34% (23 promises)
[██████████ ] Failed — 27% (18 promises)
[███████████████▍ ] In Progress / Awaiting Deadlines — 39% (27 promises)
A. Fulfilled Points (34%): The Institutional Shield
Voters received the implementation of fundamental reforms that had been blocked for decades by old elites to preserve a corrupt consensus:
- Dismantling Parliamentary Immunity: The bill completely abolishing MP immunity was passed in the very first months of the mono-majority’s tenure. A presidential impeachment law was also enacted.
- Land and Tax Sovereignty: The moratorium on the sale of agricultural land, which had been in place for nearly two decades, was lifted. Businesses received a capital amnesty via a 5% «zero declaration» mechanism. Automated weight and speed controls were launched on highways.
- Digitization of the State: Transitioning public services online (the «Diia» ecosystem) and deploying 4G in rural areas ensured the continuity of state administration and rear coordination. An «Open Skies» agreement was officially signed with the EU.
B. Failed Points (27%): Reality vs. Populism
A number of peacetime promises turned out to be utopian, shattering against internal systemic sabotage and macroeconomic laws:
- The Cadre Utopia: The declaration to completely eradicate cronyism and appoint officials exclusively through independent, open competitions failed. A shortage of personnel and a crisis of trust under wartime conditions led to key positions being filled by individuals from the president’s close circle.
- Judicial Reforms and Prohibitions: The attempt to introduce trial by jury and establish community-elected magistrates for «simple disputes» failed due to the protracted reform of the High Council of Justice. The promise to introduce a lifetime ban on public office for individuals convicted of corruption clashed with international legal standards, which viewed it as an excessive violation of civil rights.
- Budgetary Illusions: The Exit Tax (replacing corporate income tax) and a large-scale accumulative pension system with the option to inherit funds were blocked by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) due to critical deficit risks to the state budget.
C. The Gray Zone (39%): Frozen by History and Pledged as Collateral
The most complex category comprises promises whose implementation was physically halted by the war or radically rewritten under pressure from external creditors:
- A Single Presidential Term: Zelensky’s foundational promise to step down after a single five-year term has been de facto frozen. The Constitution of Ukraine explicitly prohibits holding elections under martial law, moving the issue of legitimacy from the realm of campaign pledges to that of national survival.
- Energy Exports: Plans to turn Ukraine into an energy exporter to the EU market were neutralized by systemic Russian missile strikes on critical infrastructure. The country transitioned into an importer of European electricity.
- Wartime Force Majeure: Relying on the revival of the Budapest Memorandum to return territories lost relevance. The transition to a professional army was replaced by total mobilization, though the pledge to raise military pay to NATO standards was achieved via emergency measures. The «economic passport» initiative (accumulating resource revenues for children) was frozen due to GDP contraction. Furthermore, the nature of national wealth ownership changed fundamentally under pressure from external geopolitical obligations. In the spring of 2025, the US administration and the Government of Ukraine signed the Ukraine–United States Mineral Resources Agreement. Under this deal, which became a Washington condition for continued weapons supplies, Ukraine committed to directing 50% of all revenues from the future monetization of its state natural resources (titanium, lithium, graphite, oil, and gas) into a joint Investment Reconstruction Fund with the US. Thus, instead of funding the accounts of Ukrainian children, revenues from Ukrainian critical minerals became collateral and payment for American military aid, permanently closing the chapter on pre-war resource sovereignty.
The Role of Western Financial Aid in Fulfilling Social Pledges
The core paradox of Ukrainian politics during the total war is that the state’s social promises are fulfilled not through internal tax revenues, but thanks to direct financial support from international partners.
The entire sovereign economy of Ukraine is split into two isolated circuits:
The Internal Circuit (Taxes, duties, fees): 100% directed toward financing the defense sector, military salaries, and the procurement and production of weapons. International law strictly prohibits spending foreign grants on military needs.
The External Circuit (Grants and macro-financial assistance): Completely covers the state’s civil and social obligations.
How Foreign Billions Saved the Social Contract:
Pension Payments: Zelensky’s promise to elevate seniors to modern security standards transformed into the baseline task of «simply paying basic pensions.» Thanks to World Bank programs (the PEACE project) and EU macro-financial aid, Ukraine has not once delayed payments to its more than 10 million pensioners. Without Western injections, the pension system would have suffered an immediate collapse.
Medical Guarantees and Doctors’ Salaries: The promised transition to insurance-based medicine has been de facto replaced by keeping the National Health Service of Ukraine (NHSU) afloat. Funding hospitals, purchasing duty-free medications from the US and EU, and maintaining base salaries for medical personnel became possible exclusively due to US grants.
Support for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): An entirely new social promise, not envisioned in the 2019 platform but critical for survival—providing housing and stipends to millions of internal refugees. The financing of IDP programs fell entirely on EIB (European Investment Bank) credit lines and EU macro-financial packages.
Supranational Dictat: How the IMF and EU Became the Lead Editors of Ukrainian Manifestos
In the post-war era, the epoch of sovereign lawmaking detached from global financial obligations will permanently close. Any political party aspiring to power in Ukraine will construct its manifesto not on electoral fantasies, but on the strict structural benchmarks of the IMF and the reform matrix of the European Union’s Ukraine Facility Plan. These documents will become the de facto «supranational» backbone of Ukrainian domestic policy.
The primary donor requirements that will suppress any electoral populism include:
Macroeconomic Stabilization (IMF): Budget deficit monitoring will rule out any promises of tax cuts or untargeted social subsidies. Broadening the tax base, restoring business audits, and rigorous revenue mobilization will become mandatory rules.
Uncompromising Judicial Reform and Access to Justice (EU Foundation): The primary and most painful filter from Brussels. Any movement of financial tranches is directly tied to cleaning up the judicial branch.
Future parties are obligated to include in their programs the complete finalization of the reform of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), ensuring international experts hold a deciding vote.Concurrently, a core EU requirement is ensuring real access to justice for every citizen.
This entails a radical expansion of the free secondary legal aid system, the optimization of court fees (so that filing a lawsuit is not financially prohibitive for a war-impoverished population), and total digitization through the deployment of a full-scale «Court in a Smartphone» (e-Court). This will allow millions of refugees abroad and residents of de-occupied territories to participate in hearings remotely, file lawsuits, and receive rulings without bureaucratic barriers. Dismantling corrupt judicial clans and ensuring equal access to protection is not an electoral choice; it is a condition for fiscal survival.
Anti-Corruption Architecture (EU and IMF): The absolute independence of NABU, SAPO, and HACC, autonomy for anti-corruption prosecutors, and automated AI audits of asset declarations will remain non-negotiable prerequisites for financial support.
The Green Transition and Decarbonization (EU): Party platforms will be required to incorporate adaptation to European environmental standards (CBAM), waste sorting, and the development of renewable energy.
Public Administration Reform: Donors demand a reduction in the bureaucratic apparatus alongside increased transparency via digital tools and the implementation of corporate governance at state-owned enterprises according to OECD standards.
The Civilian Shield and a Fractured Society: Anatomy of Ukraine’s Post-War Governance
In the post-war era, the anti-corruption architecture built under intense Western pressure and the future electoral process will become a single, indivisible ecosystem.
The European Union and the IMF have made it clear: the legitimacy of the future Ukrainian government directly depends on whether the state can ensure complete governance transparency and include all groups of the war-fractured population into political life.
To understand how this model will function, it is necessary to break down its institutional and demographic components.
The Closed Loop of Justice: The Four Pillars of the Anti-Corruption Shield
The requirement from Brussels is to create a cycle for prosecuting top-level corruption that is completely autonomous and shielded from political influence from the Presidential Office.
This system consists of four key agencies, each fulfilling a strictly designated role:
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU): The entry point of the entire system, responsible for investigations. The main EU requirement is the elimination of «telephone justice» and the removal of overlapping law enforcement agencies (such as the SBU) previously used to pressure businesses. NABU must receive an exclusive monopoly on investigating cases against ministers, judges, and MPs, along with autonomous wiretapping rights.
Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO): This agency provides procedural oversight and acts as the state prosecutor in court. The essence of the post-war reform is to transform SAPO into an independent island within the structure of the Prosecutor General’s Office. The head of SAPO must be chosen through a transparent competition where international experts hold a deciding vote, eliminating prosecutors’ loyalty to the ruling political elite.
High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC): The final link that delivers verdicts. The West demands an expansion of the HACC judicial staff and the provision of maximum security guarantees. The goal is to ensure that cases against corrupt officials do not «drown» for years in courts of general jurisdiction, and that verdicts are delivered swiftly and become unavoidable.
National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP): The monitoring and prevention body. The primary task of the post-war phase is to remove the human factor from the verification of asset declarations. The analysis of officials’ wealth will be handled by automated AI algorithms. They will cross-reference the official income of public servants with state property registries, including databases from EU countries, the US, and offshore zones, to detect hidden assets abroad.
The Electoral Mosaic: Three Camps of a Divided People
Future elections in Ukraine will take place under conditions of an unprecedented demographic and ideological split.
Parties and candidates will have to find a balance between three polar groups of voters whose visions for the country’s future differ fundamentally:
The Internal Circuit (Rear Civilians and Veterans)—approximately 55–60% of voters: These are citizens who remained in the country under shelling and blackouts, alongside hundreds of thousands of demobilized military personnel.
Their primary demand is strict, uncompromising internal justice.
They demand zero tolerance for corruption, which they equate to wartime looting, and the immediate confiscation of property from those who embezzle reconstruction funds.
This group will form a powerful «veteran» wing in politics, demanding the state fulfill its obligations to frontline fighters.
Forced Migration (Refugees in the EU)—approximately 25–30% of voters: Millions of Ukrainians (mostly women and children) who have spent years integrating into the European legal, economic, and social system.
Their demand serves as a liberal counterweight to internal radicalism.
They will vote for parties that guarantee the rule of law, protection of private property, transparent courts, and rapid integration into the EU, as they see no reason to return home without these conditions.
The External Hidden Circuit (Wartime Critics and Draft Evaders Abroad)—approximately 10–15% of voters: The most closed but electorally significant part of the population.
These are men and families who left the country in violation of bans, as well as citizens who oppose total mobilization and the continuation of a war of attrition. Their primary demand is legal amnesty, the cessation of criminal prosecution, protection of human rights, and civic reconciliation without public shaming or stigmatization.
Digital Democracy: Tools of Direct Control
To link the West’s anti-corruption demands with the needs of a fractured society, the state is obliged to implement tools of direct digital control, transforming direct democracy from a 2019 slogan into concrete mechanisms:
Remote Voting («Diia.Voice»): A crucial element for saving the legitimacy of the elections.
The experience of the Balkan wars proved that the classical model of voting through embassies is physically unable to handle millions of refugees.
The only solution is secure electronic voting, allowing millions of Ukrainians abroad to make their choice remotely and safely, without fearing forced registration with military enlistment offices or consular tracking.
AI-Driven Reconstruction Monitoring (The DREAM Platform): An open state ecosystem where every tranche of international donor funding is digitized.
Any citizen in Warsaw, Kyiv, or Berlin will be able to track the line item budget of a specific facility under construction (a school, hospital, or bridge) in real time, view contractors, and check procurements through the Prozorro system, minimizing the risks of embezzlement.
The Institution and Protection of Whistleblowers: The implementation of anonymous, encrypted digital communication channels directly connecting citizens with NABU.
The Western approach involves not only legal protection for a person reporting a corrupt scheme but also financial motivation—the whistleblower will receive a fixed percentage of the funds the state manages to recover to the budget thanks to their report.
The Core Paradox of Post-War Legitimacy
This entire complex architecture exposes the key paradox of Ukraine’s post-war transition.
The stability of the state and the continuation of financial support from the West are possible only if the electoral system incorporates the voices of absolutely all parts of the population.
If the government attempts to hold elections under an «abridged» scheme, ignoring millions of refugees and hidden emigrants abroad due to their political stance or draft evasion, the European Union will declare such elections non-representative.
This will automatically trigger a freeze on macro-financial assistance, halt Euro-integration, and lead to a subsequent financial default. Ukraine’s future depends on its ability to grant a safe and equal voice to every Ukrainian, regardless of where they happen to be when the war ends.
Political Barometer: The Downward Track and the Crisis of Legitimacy
The electoral landscape of Ukraine demonstrates deep disillusionment, exhaustion from the prolonged crisis, and a pronounced degradation of trust in key political figures.
Data from leading sociological institutions (KIIS, Razumkov Center) record a steady decline in approval ratings for the current authorities.
Volodymyr Zelensky (The Downward Spiral): Trust indicators have suffered a critical drop compared to the consensus period of 2022 (when support reached 90%). Sociological data shows trust has dropped to 54%, while distrust has surged to 41%, leaving the balance on the verge of statistical volatility.Concurrently, sociologists detect an institutional trap: a significant portion of those stating they «trust» the president do so out of a desire for «wartime rally-around-the-flag» unity centered on the institution of the presidency during active hostilities. However, the same respondents indicate in closed-ended questions that they do not wish to see Zelensky in politics after the war ends. The primary drivers of the collapsing rating are the grueling situation at the front, a flawed cadre policy, and a succession of high-profile corruption investigations within his immediate circle.
Military Leadership and Armed Forces (The Absolute Leader): In contrast to collapsing civilian institutions, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and key combat generals retain the highest level of absolute trust in the country—above 80-85%. Society draws a sharp line between the military as a guarantor of physical survival and the political leadership, creating a massive demand for the emergence of a new «veteran» political force in the post-war period.
The Old Guard (Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko): The ratings of traditional opposition leaders remain flat at the level of their pre-war electoral strongholds. Their personal disapproval ratings remain critically high, blocking any opportunity for them to present a viable alternative despite their systematic criticism of the administration.
Demand for a Total Reset: Sociologists record a historic high (over 60%) in the demand for a «Third Force».
Society feels an acute need for professional technocrats, volunteers with unblemished reputations, and combat officers untainted by pre-war political feuds and early-war failures.
Legal Compromise and Electoral Transition: Amnesty Frameworks and the Balkan Precedent
Bringing millions of citizens from the external hidden circuit back into the political fold will require Ukraine to take extraordinary legislative steps outside the boundaries of its usual legal framework.
International institutions and human rights defenders will issue a strict ultimatum regarding the legal framework for post-war amnesty before certifying elections as democratic.
The plan developed by Council of Europe experts divides amnesty into three tiers:
- Unconditional Decriminalization of the «External Circuit»: A complete waiver of criminal liability for individuals who left the country in violation of mobilization laws («draft evaders»). International law classifies conscientious objection to military service as an inherent human right. Without lifting remote indictments and property seizures, refugees will simply bypass voting due to fear of prosecution.
- Administrative Amnesty for the «Internal Circuit»: The annulment of fines and records for citizens who incurred penalties for administrative violations of military registration rules inside the country.
- Amnesty Red Lines: High treason, espionage, war crimes, proven collaborationism, and top-tier corruption are strictly non-negotiable and excluded from any review.
The Balkan Precedent: Voting in Exile
The historical experience of the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s demonstrates how to navigate such challenges.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996), under the stewardship of the OSCE, elections were organized remotely by mail and at specialized polling stations in asylum countries, allowing 1.2 million refugees to dilute the monopoly of local radicals.
In Croatia (1995–1997), voting was restricted exclusively to embassies, which resulted in massive lines and the effective disenfranchisement of up to 80% of citizens.
Heeding this lesson, the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, in tandem with EU partners, is drafting a strategy to open polling stations outside diplomatic missions—utilizing rented exhibition spaces and stadiums across Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic.
Risks of Halting Euro-Integration
Attempting to run elections under an «abridged» format (restricted to citizens inside the country) poses an existential threat to Ukraine’s integration trajectory.
Political Veto from Brussels: According to the Copenhagen Criteria, the deliberate exclusion of millions of voters will freeze EU membership negotiations, relegating Ukraine to the status of a «perpetual candidate» akin to Turkey.
Financial Default: The performance indicators of the Ukraine Facility plan are explicitly tied to the preservation of civil rights. Violating the electoral sovereignty of refugees will trigger an immediate freeze on EU grants. Without the External Circuit’s macro-financial assistance, meeting baseline social obligations (pensions and doctors’ salaries) will become untenable.
Loss of Narrative Control: «Abridged» elections will legitimize Russia’s propaganda narrative in international forums (UN, G20) depicting a «non-legitimate Kyiv regime,» thereby eroding Western sanctions pressure.
Electoral Impasse: Zelensky’s Statements, Moral Ground, and Strategy Accountability
The final and most volatile flashpoint of future Ukrainian elections is the participation of the incumbent president.
Volodymyr Zelensky has publicly stated that if elections occur during or immediately after the war, he will not abandon the country and will run, justifying this as his responsibility as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief who guided the state through the gravest crisis in its history.
However, this trajectory exposes a deep schism regarding moral ground and political accountability:
The Stance of Supporters and the Presidential Office: Zelensky’s base maintains he holds every moral right to seek re-election.
In their view, a president who refused to flee Kyiv during the critical days of February 2022, maintained state functionality, and forged an unprecedented international coalition must finish the task—leading the country to a peace settlement and formal EU accession. Within this paradigm, his candidacy is viewed as a pillar of stability.
The Stance of the Opposition and Critical Blocs (Including Emigrés): Opponents within the country, alongside a significant portion of the millions of displaced refugees and anti-war critics abroad, hold a starkly adversarial view.
This camp demands that Zelensky face political accountability for a failed war strategy.
They hold him responsible for failing to adequately prepare the nation for a full-scale invasion in the pre-war months despite Western intelligence warnings, tactical errors in counteroffensive planning, and dragging the nation into a war of attrition that has resulted in millions of casualties (refugees, wounded, and deceased), alongside an aggressive mobilization policy that has stripped overseas citizens of basic rights. From their perspective, a leader who oversaw such a tragedy forfeits the moral ground required to govern a post-war state.
The Legitimacy Paradox for the European Union:
This divide presents Brussels with a profound dilemma.
For EU integration to proceed, future elections in Ukraine must be flawlessly democratic. Yet, if millions of refugees and hidden émigrés (who dissent from the current military strategy) are locked out of the vote or boycott it out of fear of state retribution, the election loses its representative validity.
The future legitimacy of the Ukrainian government will remain compromised if the electoral process devolves into a ballot «exclusively for those remaining inside the system,» silencing the voices of those who paid for the war with forced exile.
Conclusion
The era of flamboyant, unbridled populism in Ukraine is gone for good. Having survived an existential crisis, Ukrainian society and its political class are transitioning toward a strict, pragmatic, and digitized contract. The political honesty of the future will lie not in the ability to speak eloquently or offer unsustainable peacetime promises, but in the capacity to operate within rigid institutional constraints, where every word uttered by a leader is backed either by an IMF tranche or a line item in the defense budget.
Last Updated on 19.10.2026 by iskova