Whose Facade Is Prettier? Ukraine and Moldova Compete at Imitating European Integration, or a Euro-Renovation With No Finish Line

Which European country can match Ukraine in the length, cost and futility of its reforms?

There is a classic joke in the construction business: a renovation can never be finished, only stopped by an act of will. It seems this piece of building wisdom has been elevated to the status of state doctrine in Kyiv and Chisinau.

For more than thirty years, Ukraine and Moldova have been doing what Brussels calls «deep structural transformations» and what, in the language of reality, amounts to the endless whitewashing of a facade. Presidents change, constitutions are rewritten, and billions of euros and dollars dissolve into judicial robes and short-lived anti-corruption agencies.

Now that both countries officially stand on the threshold of the EU, it is time to take an honest look at the estimate for this «euro-renovation,» a post-Soviet term for a showy, «Western-standard» makeover, with no official standard behind it and no equivalent category in Europe itself. The question is which of them has learned to imitate a European future better, at greater cost and with fewer results.

Comparing countries by how «futile» or «drawn out» their reforms are is a subjective exercise. Still, in political and economic research (for example, reports of the EBRD, the World Bank or the Transparency International index), Ukraine is most often compared with Moldova or with the Western Balkans, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina. Below is a direct comparison on the key problem areas.

A comparison of long-running reforms

Why are reforms in these countries called «eternal»?

• Imitation instead of transformation. In political science, the terms «facade democracy» and «stabilization without modernization» have long been applied to Moldova and Ukraine. Laws were adopted to obtain the next IMF or EU tranche, but did not work in practice.
• The «squirrel in a wheel» effect in Moldova. The country experienced the theft of a billion dollars from its banking system in 2014, right in the middle of active pro-European reforms. This set back reform of the justice and financial sectors by years and forced the country to spend new funds correcting old mistakes.
• The Balkan dead end. Bosnia and Herzegovina spends enormous sums on maintaining its bureaucratic apparatus. Ethnic and institutional veto points have repeatedly delayed the reforms required for EU accession.

Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina show long-running systemic problems similar to Ukraine’s. An analysis of three critical areas, and of these countries’ financial losses, shows how reforms stall under pressure from internal factors.

A three-sphere analysis: courts, corruption and the economy

Judicial reform (vetting and «cleansing»)

Ukrainian judicial reform resembles the hydra of myth: each time activists and international experts cut off one head of the judicial mafia, two new ones grow in its place, with impeccable declarations and millionaire relatives.

In Moldova, the cleansing of the judiciary went so far that judges began resigning whole chambers at a time. The system has finally been cleansed of corruption by the most reliable method: it has almost no judges left.

The Ukrainian case (imitation ahead of deadlines and a rollback to corporatism). In Ukraine, the cleansing process suffers from a different ailment: legal maneuvering. In June 2026, the Verkhovna Rada hastily adopted a law on a unified judicial integrity declaration (a key condition for releasing more than €380 million suspended under the fifth instalment of the Ukraine Facility). Experts, however, are sounding the alarm: while laws are adopted for the sake of tranches, real systemic steps are being sabotaged. For example, with the completion of the work of the first international Selection Commission that formed the High Qualification Commission of Judges, Ukraine risks returning to the old judicial corporatism, in which the system again begins to select «its own» without outside control.

The Moldovan case (mass exodus and a shortage of personnel). The main stumbling block has been the pre-vetting and vetting procedure, a comprehensive check of judges and prosecutors for integrity with the participation of international experts. The process has gone on for years and is accompanied by covert resistance from the judiciary. Instead of cleansing, the result has been a collapse. In February 2023, 16 judges of the Supreme Court of Justice resigned in a single day, reportedly to avoid evaluation, and the evaluation commission later counted 22 of the court’s 25 judges who left before being checked. In May 2024, 20 of the 40 judges of the Chisinau Court of Appeal resigned days before the commission was due to begin examining their finances. By early 2026, the vetting commission’s chair was describing the most critical shortages as some 60 vacancies in the courts of appeal, 15 in the anti-corruption panels and 13 at the Supreme Court. As of July 2026, the Supreme Court had only 12 of its 20 seats filled. The situation mirrors Ukraine’s problems with the High Qualification Commission and the High Council of Justice, and Brussels openly criticizes Chisinau for the pace of reform.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. For years the European Commission has recorded «no progress or limited progress» in the judiciary. Attempts to introduce checks of judges’ declarations have been blocked by the political elites. The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council is effectively divided along ethnic lines and operates under the direct influence of the leaders of the entities (especially Republika Srpska).

The fight against corruption

In our part of the world, the fight against corruption has long since turned into a popular spectator sport. What matters here is not the result, a prison sentence, but a spectacular live-broadcast arrest and a subsequent bail that the suspect pays from pocket money.

The number of anti-corruption bodies in Kyiv already exceeds the number of corrupt officials themselves. Soon the agencies will begin fighting each other, simply to meet a quarterly plan for media activity.

Moldova. After the «theft of the billion» from the banking system in 2014, the institutions were paralyzed. The Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (the analogue of Ukraine’s SAPO) waged internal wars for a long time with the National Anti-Corruption Center. Cases against top corrupt officials rarely end in actual prison terms, and most of the figures in major cases managed to flee the country.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Bosnia and Herzegovina scored 34 out of 100 and ranked 109th. The political elite uses state institutions for personal enrichment. EU reports describe the country’s track record on corruption as weak, with very few final convictions in high-level cases. Laws on conflict of interest and whistleblower protection are openly blocked.

The economic sector

Moldova absorbs European loans with the grace of an experienced debtor: it takes a billion on its word of honor to carry out reforms, spends it patching holes, and when Brussels demands an accounting, asks for another half billion to audit the previous spending.

Western financial aid has become an ideal painkiller for our economies: it relieves the symptoms of poverty very well but does not treat the disease itself. The patient is alive as long as the euro drip keeps running.

The Moldovan case (a financial perpetual motion machine). For a long time the economy suffered from monopolization by oligarchic groups (in the era of Vlad Plahotniuc). The country depends critically on migrant remittances and external financial aid. Chisinau performs feats of balancing. The European Commission approved a record Growth Plan of €1.9 billion for Moldova for 2025–2027. The mechanism works like clockwork: the Moldovan government feverishly delivers 18 reforms linked to the Growth Plan to receive a fresh tranche of €157 million, paid on 5 October 2026. The money enters the budget, but the fundamental sector, justice, still stalls. The result is an ideal scheme: Brussels is forced to pay to keep the Moldovan facade viable, hoping that someday the reforms will work. The energy sector was for years an instrument of political pressure. Moldova synchronized its power grid with the continental European network in 2022 and is now integrating into the European electricity market.

The Ukrainian case (reforms under the auditors’ microscope). Ukraine’s financial lifeline is far larger. The country has to balance between colossal external support and constant pressure from its sponsors. Key judicial reforms and appointments have been built into the EU’s reform conditionality. According to experts, Ukrainian authorities also regularly «cut corners»: laws are adopted in a version that formally satisfies the EU but preserves loopholes for local elites (as happened with the amendments to declarations of judges’ family ties). EU assessments show that substantial funding continues to arrive, while the risk of reform backsliding remains.

Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country has a critically bloated public sector that absorbs budget funds to maintain party appointees. The domestic market is fragmented because of the lack of coordination between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Investors avoid long-term projects because of political risks, constant threats of separatism and a very complex permitting system.

The financial losses in detail: loans and grants

Unlike Ukraine, whose financial losses are now largely related to the war, the losses in Moldova and Bosnia are funds not received («lost profit») because reforms were not carried out, together with money that dissolved into ineffective institutions.

The financial difference is this: Moldova actively absorbs funds by meeting conditions «at the last moment,» while Bosnia and Herzegovina has already lost part of its allocation through political bargaining over its reform program.

Moldova: the price of «eternal reforms» and new tranches

For Moldova, EU financial support is the main driver of the economy’s survival, but disbursement comes in waves, and tranches were regularly frozen in past years because of reform rollbacks.

• 2021–2025. Between 2021 and 2025, the EU allocated more than €1.2 billion in grants to Moldova. A significant part went to direct budget support, to covering utility tariffs and to protracted judicial and legal reforms.
• Growth Plan 2025–2027. A large package of about €1.9 billion has been approved (€1.5 billion in concessional loans and €385 million in grants). The money is disbursed strictly step by step. With the €157 million paid on 5 October 2026, the total made available to Moldova under the Plan has reached €661 million. According to the Moldovan government, 40 further reform measures worth €380.8 million are planned for the second half of 2026 and 67 measures worth €593.4 million for 2027.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: a catastrophe of missed opportunities

Bosnia’s situation is a classic example of a direct loss of money through the futility of reforms. The country is losing money that the EU is ready to allocate, because the local elite haggles over and sabotages the conditions.

• The IPA instrument (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance). Every year the EU allocates substantial funds through IPA to strengthen the rule of law and reform justice (for example, a modest project like EU4Justice costs €2.2 million). EU assessments nevertheless continue to report stagnation in broader judicial reform.
• The EU Growth Plan. Bosnia’s allocation under the Growth Plan was originally €1.085 billion. The Commission cut it by 10% (about €108.5 million) because of delays in submitting the Reform Agenda, leaving €976.6 million. The agenda (113 steps) was held up for months by disputes between the entities, above all over measures concerning the Constitutional Court and the State Aid Council. It was adopted on 30 September 2025 and approved by the Commission in December 2025.
• Direct losses. Bosnia’s allocation has therefore already been cut by about €108 million. According to the head of the EU Delegation, Luigi Soreca, a further €373 million is at risk if reforms on the rule of law, judicial integrity, conflicts of interest and whistleblower protection are not delivered by the end of 2026. According to regional reporting, none of the 113 reform steps had been fully implemented so far.

A direct comparison of financial effectiveness

The syndrome of «stabilization without modernization»

Experts note that Ukraine and Moldova at least demonstrate «dynamics»: they pass laws, create anti-corruption bodies and go through painful judicial vetting (albeit with constant scandals and stalls). Bosnia and Herzegovina embodies a stage of absolute deadlock, where European money literally burns up or is cancelled because politicians are unwilling to change the system.

It is time for Brussels to admit that Kyiv and Chisinau have turned the imitation of reform into a self-sufficient ecosystem, in which the European facade is held up solely by loans and construction foam.

There is no point in declaring a winner in this battle of facades: both countries have honestly earned their gold in the discipline of «adopting laws.»

Officials in Kyiv and Chisinau can sleep peacefully. They have created an ideal economic perpetual motion machine. In this system, laws are adopted for the sake of tranches, tranches are spent on auditing the laws, and the audit shows that new laws are needed and, accordingly, new tranches. Everyone comes out ahead except European and local taxpayers, and common sense.

As some analysts note, Ukraine wins on scale and drama, Moldova on the elegance of its sabotage. And while the facade is held up by a promise and fresh headlines in the press, the show called «Integration Without End» is guaranteed a renewal for the next season.

Western money preserves the current inefficient state of affairs and creates the illusion of forward movement. In both Kyiv and Chisinau, external financing plays the role of a painkiller. Instead of stimulating real economic growth through the rule of law, grants and soft loans are spent on covering budget deficits.

A paradoxical situation has arisen: if the reforms were successfully and fully completed, the need for endless «expert missions,» «monitoring» and «donor pools» would disappear. Officials on both sides, consciously or not, drag out the process, because the euro-renovation feeds the whole ecosystem while its finish is in no one’s interest.

A successful end to the reforms is a nightmare for a whole class of officials and consultants on both sides of the border. If the house is finally completed, the foremen will have to hand over the keys and lose their funding. So the renovation will continue as long as Brussels is willing to pay the rent on the scaffolding.

In the end, Brussels should stop demanding the impossible. Any boring EU member such as Austria or the Netherlands can build a functioning state governed by law, but to spend three decades successfully selling the same unfinished building as promising luxury European housing is a true art that cannot be measured in money. The IMF will still try.

The doors to the European Union remain open to both countries, but they lead to an endless construction site rather than a gleaming hall of standards.

The outcome of this fascinating competition is bleak for the admissions committee in Brussels. Ukraine and Moldova resemble two eternal students who have spent thirty years retaking the same exam in law. They have learned all the clever words, bought the most expensive pens with IMF grants, and mastered a pitiful look for the professors of the European Commission. The only problem is that in the end they will be given a diploma not for knowledge but for years of service at the door of the lecture hall. The main thing is that by the time of their official enrolment the university building itself does not collapse under the weight of their endless appeals.

Scenarios and forecasts for Ukraine and Moldova (to the end of 2027)

Brussels’ relations with Kyiv and Chisinau have entered a phase of «hard pragmatism.» The period of unconditional advances is over: both countries are tied to strict funding schedules, in which each tranche depends on step-by-step completion of reforms. Based on the current dynamics of judicial sabotage and financial needs, experts see two key scenarios through the end of 2027.

Scenario 1: «Managed unfinished construction» (realistic-optimistic)

In this scenario both countries continue to balance on the edge of deadlines, delivering «turnkey reforms» at the last moment to ensure the survival of their economies.

Moldova. Chisinau continues to absorb the record €1.9 billion Growth Plan successfully. The country has already shown the ability to deliver packages of conditions: the government completed 18 reforms linked to the Growth Plan, and the Commission paid a €157 million tranche on 5 October 2026, bringing the total made available to €661 million. Through the end of 2027, Moldova will deliver the technical markers (digitalization, energy, roads) but will keep its staffing paralysis in the courts. Brussels will turn a blind eye in order to prevent a geopolitical reversal in the country in the run-up to elections.

Ukraine. Kyiv continues to coordinate its financial and defense needs with the European Commission every month. According to the Ministry of Finance, Ukraine will need about $52.6 billion in external financing in 2027. Regular disbursements are now firmly tied to agreed reform indicators, although the Ukraine Facility has also provided substantial pre-financing, so the Verkhovna Rada will have to stamp out compromise laws (including complex tax changes such as levies on international parcels). Money will keep arriving, but with creaks and delays.

The outcome for the facade. The renovation continues. Laws are adopted, institutions function on paper, the euro drip keeps running and provides stability to the economies, but the fundamental cleansing of the judicial systems never takes place.

Scenario 2: «Donor fatigue and freeze» (critical)

This scenario materializes if the sabotage of local elites crosses Brussels’ «red lines» and provokes an actual halt in payments, as has already begun to happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For Moldova. The critical point will be the remaining reform tranches (40 measures in the second half of 2026 and 67 in 2027), where bypassing the judicial vetting conditions will become technically impossible. If parliament continues to dilute European Court of Human Rights standards in order to appoint the «right people,» the European Commission may temporarily freeze the remaining reform-linked funds (close to €1 billion). For Moldova, which depends critically on external aid, this would mean a severe budget crisis.

For Ukraine. The risk is concentrated around the EU’s requirements to maintain tight control over politically exposed persons (PEPs) and to combat oligarchic loopholes. If Ukrainian courts, after the work of the international selection commissions ends, finally slide back into corporatism (the scheme of «electing one’s own»), the EU may block major tranches from the new aid package. Against the background of the IMF’s preliminary estimate, reported by Bloomberg, of an uncovered financing gap of up to $54 billion through 2029 (of which $30–35 billion falls in 2027), this would lead to a sharp fall in defense production and a new inflationary spiral.

The outcome. The scaffolding falls. Brussels moves to the Bosnian scenario: financing is frozen, and the reforms are recognized as having reached a final dead end.

Forecast table: financial markers through the end of 2027

General conclusion for the end of 2027

Neither Ukraine, whose «optimization» of reforms is constrained by the scale of its needs, nor Moldova, stuck in the personnel wars of its justice system, will complete its euro-renovation. Brussels will be forced to maintain both construction sites, because recognizing their complete failure would cost European geopolitics even more.

Last Updated on 07.10.2026 by iskova